Historians make choices of emphasis and causation in the histories they write. If you were writing a history of the material covered in Module 2, which wou

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U.S. Coast Guard History Program

The U.S. Coast Guard in World War I

The outbreak of World War I in 1914 saw cutters become responsible for enforcing U.S. neutrality laws. With the declaration of war against Germany on 6 April 1917, a coded dispatch was transmitted from Washington to every cutter and shore station of the Coast Guard. Officers and enlisted men, vessels and units, were transferred to the operational control of the Navy Department. The Navy was augmented by 223 commissioned officers, approximately 4,500 enlisted men, 47 vessels of all types, and 279 stations scattered along the entire United States coastline.

On the morning of Dec. 6, 1917, a tremendous blast ripped through the sleepy town of Halifax, Nova Scotia (left). The explosion destroyed 3,000 dwellings, killed more than 1,600 people and injured 9,000. Many of the dead were children. That morning the French freighter Mont Blanc, carrying 5,000 tons of TNT, collided with the Norwegian steamship Imo in Halifax's outer harbor. Unfortunately, after the collision, a fire

started, and the crewmen tried to put it out rather than scuttle the ship. When the fire reached the TNT, an explosion – equal to a small nuclear blast occurred. The Mont Blanc virtually disappeared, and the shock waves threw the Imo ashore. The Mont Blanc disaster ranks as one of the worst maritime tragedies of all times. This particular ship sailed from New York on its way to Europe, one of hundreds that loaded explosive cargoes in New York for the war in Europe. It was this disaster that stirred American leaders to empower the Coast Guard to ensure that this never happened in the United States. The Coast Guard and its predecessor agency, the Revenue Cutter Service, have long been tied to the movement and anchorage of vessels in U.S. territorial waters. The RCS was first tasked with this job during 1888 in New York. By 1915, when the Coast Guard was created, the service was directed by the Rivers and Harbors Act "to establish anchorage grounds for vessels in all harbors, rivers, bays and other navigable waters of the United States . . . ." During World

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War I, the Coast Guard continued to enforce rules and regulations that governed the anchorage and movements of vessels in American harbors. The Espionage Act, passed in June 1917, gave the Coast Guard further power to protect merchant shipping from sabotage. This act included the safeguarding of waterfront property, supervision of vessel movements, establishment of anchorages and restricted areas, and the right to control and remove people aboard ships. The tremendous increase in munitions shipments, particularly in New York, required an increase in personnel to oversee this activity. The term "captain of the port" was first used in New York and this officer was charged with supervising the safe loading of explosives. During the war a similar post was established in other U.S. ports. During World War I, CAPT Godfrey L. Carden, commander of the Coast Guard's New York Division (right), was named COTP in that harbor. The majority of the nation's munitions shipments abroad left through New York. For a period of 1 1/2 years, more than 1,600 vessels, carrying more than 345- million tons of explosives, sailed from this port. In 1918, Carden's division was the largest single command in the Coast Guard. It was made up of over 1,400 officers and men, four Corps of Engineers tugs and five harbor cutters.

In August and September 1917, six Coast Guard cutters, Ossipee, Seneca, Yamacraw, Algonquin, Manning, and Tampa left the United States to join U.S. naval forces in European waters. They constituted Squadron 2 of Division 6 of the patrol forces of the Atlantic Fleet and were based at Gibraltar. Throughout the war they escorted hundreds of vessels between Gibraltar and the British Isles, as well as escort and patrol duty in the Mediterranean. The other large cutters performed similar duties in home waters, off Bermuda, in the Azores, in the Caribbean, and off the coast of Nova Scotia. They operated either under the orders of the commandants of the various naval districts or under the direct orders of the Chief of Naval Operations.

A large number of Coast Guard officers held important commands during World War I. Twenty-four commanded naval warships in the war zone, five commanded warships attached to the American Patrol detachment in the Caribbean Sea, twenty-three commanded warships attached to naval districts, and five Coast Guard officers commanded large training camps. Six were assigned to aviation duty, two of which commanded important air stations including one in France. Shortly after the Armistice, four Coast Guard officers were assigned to command

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large naval transports engaged in bringing the troops home from France. Officers not assigned to command served in practically every phase of naval activity, on transports, cruisers, cutters, patrol vessels, in naval districts, as inspectors, and at training camps. Of the 223 commissioned officers of the Coast Guard, seven met their deaths as a result of enemy action.

The cutter Tampa distinguished itself during the war. Under the command of Captain Charles Satterlee, she sailed from New York on 16 September 1917 for service in European waters. Tampa proceeded to Gibraltar via the Azores Islands and was assigned to a division of escorts convoying between Gibraltar and England. On 5 September 1918, Rear Admiral Niblack, commanding the U.S. naval forces based at Gibraltar addressed a special letter of commendation to Captain Satterlee. He called attention to the fact that Tampa, since her arrival, had escorted 18 convoys between Gibraltar and the United Kingdom, was never disabled, and was ready whenever called upon. Admiral Albert Niblack stated,

This excellent record is an evidence of a high state of efficiency and excellent ship’s spirit and an organization capable of keeping the vessel in service with a minimum of shore assistance. The squadron commander takes great pleasure in congratulating the commanding officer, officers, and crew on the record which they have made.

On the evening of 26 September 1918, the Tampa, having completed its duty as ocean escort for a convoy from Gibraltar to the United Kingdom, proceeded toward the port of Milford Haven, Wales. At 8:45 p.m. a loud explosion was heard by the convoy. Tampa failed to arrive at its destination and U.S. destroyers and British patrol craft made a search of the area. Nothing but a small amount of wreckage identified as belonging to the Tampa and two unidentified bodies in

naval uniforms were found. It is believed that Tampa was sunk by UB-91 which reported sinking an American warship fitting Tampa’s description (left). One hundred-fifteen, 111 of whom were Coast Guard personnel, perished. With the possible exception of the collier Cyclops, whose fate and date of loss have never been ascertained, this was the largest loss of life incurred by any U.S. naval unit during the war. An additional 81 Coast Guardsmen lost their lives in World War I due to accident or illness. In the end 8,835 men had served in the Coast Guard during World War I.

Vice Admiral C.H. Dare of the British Navy, the commanding officer at Milford Haven, in a telegram to Admiral Sims, expressed the universal sympathy felt at Milford Haven by all ranks and rates in the loss of Tampa,

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Myself and staff enjoyed the personal friendship of her commanding officer, Captain Charles Satterlee and had great admiration for his intense enthusiasm and high ideals of duty…

The British Admiralty addressed the following remarks to Admiral Sims:

Their Lordships desire me to express their deep regret at the loss of the U.S.S. Tampa. Her record since she has been employed in European waters as an ocean escort to convoys has been remarkable. She has acted in the capacity of ocean escort to no less than 18 convoys from Gibraltar comprising 350 vessels, with a loss of only two ships through enemy action. The commanders of the convoys have recognized the ability with which the Tampa carried out the duties of ocean escort. Appreciation of the good work done by the U.S.S. Tampa may be some consolation to those bereft and their Lordships would be glad if this could be conveyed to those concerned.

CHAPTER 11 Defending Imperial Interests in Asia and the Caribbean, 1898–1941 In 1898, the United States became an empire and started acting like one. It annexed colonies and territories in Asia and the Caribbean, continuously deployed naval power to newly acquired bases in the Caribbean and the Pacific, and soon conducted long, unpopular military occupations. It fought insurgencies in four countries, killing tens of thousands of combatants and noncombatants. It trained foreign police forces throughout the Caribbean and kept thousands of troops in China to defend businessmen and missionaries. All of these operations—plus World War I—caused the Navy and Marine Corps to grow. In 1898, the Navy had 160 ships in active service. By 1935, it had 320. The Marine Corps’ active-duty personnel tripled in the same period and the Navy’s quadrupled.

This larger role for the Navy in foreign affairs was both a continuation of earlier trends and a departure from them. America has always been an experiment in expansion: since the first settlement at Jamestown in 1607, white settlers had consistently expanded westward, settling new territory at the expense of Indians and, later, Mexicans. The nation’s hemispheric ambitions can be dated to 1823, when the Monroe Doctrine proclaimed the Western Hemisphere closed to European colonial expansion and banned the transfer of colonies from one outside power to another (even though the United States lacked the military force to enforce such a policy). Given these earlier patterns, it is no surprise that at the start of the twentieth century, with the economy booming and no frontier left to settle, Americans began going abroad in search of markets and missions alike.

But the expansionist foreign policy of the early twentieth century also represented a departure from earlier patterns. For its first hundred years, the United States believed itself to be fundamentally different from the European powers and used the rhetoric of anticolonialism as the proof of that difference. And yet, after 1898, the United States took colonies and territories and fought “Banana Wars” that were virtually indistinguishable from the European colonial wars Americans had become so fond of disdaining. Somehow, the fact that the United States had to traverse water to take the new territories made a difference: conquering the North American continent through Indian removal and the Mexican War could be called something other than colonialism; taking Guam, Hawaii, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico could not. An American Anti-Imperialist League emerged to oppose the new foreign policy in 1898, but, even with such prominent members as Jane Addams, Andrew Carnegie, John Dewey, and Mark Twain, it had little effect.

Despite their limited influence, the anti-imperialists were right to protest because this was not national defense. In most cases, the goal was to increase America’s sphere of influence by keeping larger European navies at bay. Other times, the operations were motivated less by strategy and more by economics, as well as by an idealistic vision of spreading democracy and good governance. None of the countries the United States invaded or occupied presented any significant threat to US national security.

In the end, the efforts to contain European influence mostly succeeded. So too did the efforts to protect American business interests, though the record here is more mixed. The attempts at uplift through occupation were almost all complete failures.

The Philippine–American War and Cuban Occupations Most Americans think of the Spanish–American War as both “splendid” and “little” because they focus only on the six-month conflict between the United States and Spain. But, after that war concluded, an anticolonial insurgency continued in the Philippines for several years. Just 379 Americans were killed taking the Philippines from Spain. Another 4,000 died trying to convince the new colonial subjects to accept American rule.

The Americans’ problems with the Filipinos began before the war even ended. Despite having destroyed Spain’s fleet, Admiral Dewey had no forces to occupy the colony and, in June, Filipino guerillas surrounded the Spanish garrison in Manila. At first, Dewey thought he could cooperate with the Filipinos and sent a cruiser to Hong Kong to bring in their commander, a 29-year-old former provincial mayor named Emilio Aguinaldo. Urging Aguinaldo to “go ashore and start your army,” Dewey and other American officials either hinted or proclaimed outright that the United States had no plans to keep the Philippines. Aguinaldo hastily declared himself the supreme chief of the nation, read a declaration of independence, and persuaded an American businessman named Colonel L. M. Johnson (retired) to sign it. (Despite his previous military experience, Colonel Johnson had no official role in the Philippines; he was in Asia to exhibit a new invention—the cinematograph.) Admiral Dewey refused to attend the ceremony or give any recognition to Aguinaldo’s government.

After Aguinaldo went ashore, the Spanish in Manila were even more helpless than before, but still they would not surrender. They feared they would be slaughtered en masse by the Filipinos if they did; moreover, as they explained to the Americans, they could be court martialed for cowardice if they surrendered without a fight. The two sides arrived at a bizarre solution: a phony battle. Admiral Dewey ordered his ships to fire on Manila—but to hit nothing of consequence—and the Spanish were supposed to fire wide of the mark as well. Unfortunately, well-meaning sailors adjusted the gun coordinates to hit the defenders. The Spanish panicked and shot to kill. Six Americans and almost 50 Spaniards died before the charade ended and the garrison

surrendered. The Americans occupied Manila alone and prohibited Aguinaldo from participating in the surrender ceremonies or stationing any of his troops in the city.

President William McKinley had not ordered the occupation of Manila, but, unwilling to turn its residents over to Aguinaldo and nervous about the European warships lurking in the harbor, he decided to keep the Philippines. His greatest concern was keeping them out of the hands of other colonizers—Germany in particular—but the islands’ close proximity to China convinced him they would be useful for opening markets in Asia as well. Despite loud and frequent cries from anti-imperial voices in Congress, McKinley insisted it was America’s duty “to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and Christianize them,” a justification that ignored the fact that most of the Philippines had been Catholic for more than 200 years.2 1

Aguinaldo and his insurrectos vowed to fight. Once the insurgency began, it quickly degenerated into the type of brutality that irregular wars always entail. The US Army provided the bulk of the troops, but 300 marines participated as well under the command of a hard-fighting, hard-drinking commander, Major Littleton W. T. Waller. The Americans encountered few constraints on warfare in the “boondocks” (an Americanism stemming from a Tagalog word meaning “mountain”) and responded in kind. American soldiers and marines shot prisoners, used torture in interrogations, burned whole villages, and set up camps that killed thousands through disease. One marine wrote home that his men “were hiking all the time killing all we come across.” After a surprise attack on the Americans at Balangiga, Samar, in 1901, the Army general in charge, Brigadier General Jacob “Hell-Roaring Jake” Smith, told Waller, “I want no prisoners. I wish you to kill and burn. The more you kill and burn, the better you will please me.” Anyone over the age of 10 was to be considered a combatant. Waller reminded his men that “we are not making war on women and children” but, in fact, few Americans made firm distinctions between suspected and confirmed insurgents.3 After Waller executed 11 of his own Filipino guides without a trial, he was court martialed for murder but acquitted. Brigadier General Smith also went to trial and was forced into retirement after being convicted of undermining good order and discipline. By 1902, the insurgency had mostly ended, but not because of the brutal tactics on Samar. The principal reason for the victory was the eventual capture of Emilio Aguinaldo, which led to an amnesty for all fighters. Efforts to couple carrots with sticks also helped. In addition to battling the insurrectos, the Americans built schools, established hospitals, and administered vaccines. Along the way, they killed between 16,000 and 50,000 Filipinos in combat and another 200,000 civilians died, mostly of disease and famine. And, while most of the insurgents gave up in 1902, the Muslims of Mindanao fought the Americans intermittently for years thereafter. The Filipino government continues to fight them to this day with the help of American special forces.

Operations in Cuba were far less bloody but had similarly long-lasting effects. When US forces landed in 1898, most Americans expected their troops to stay just long enough to wrest the island from Spain. Much of the public support for war with Spain had come from a desire to liberate the Cubans from colonial rule, and Congress had already forbidden the annexation of the island. In the end, the initial occupying force stayed for four years and only left after Congress passed the Platt Amendment, which asserted the United States’ unilateral rights to take naval bases and to intervene politically and militarily in Cuba’s internal affairs in perpetuity. With Cuba under US protection and influence, teams of American lawyers swept in to snap up titles to the arable lands and, by 1905, 13,000 Americans held land titles in Cuba.

American troops left Cuba in 1902, but in 1906 Cuba’s government faced an armed revolt from its own veterans of the 1898 war. The Navy and Marine Corps returned to impose order and established a provisional government that ruled the island for three years. During that time the military-dominated government protected the now considerable amounts of American property, dispensed more contracts to American firms, and expanded the national police force into an army, which every political faction in the country worried would be used to target political opponents. American forces landed again in 1912 and garrisoned forces in Cuba from 1917 to 1922. In the 1930s, the United States helped a young military officer named Fulgencio Batista to establish what became a military dictatorship. With Batista’s strong connections to the American business community (and the American mafia), Havana flourished while the rural poor suffered. By 1959, US companies owned 90 percent of the mines, 80 percent of the utilities, 40 percent of the sugar companies, and almost all of the oil in Cuba. That same year, Batista was ousted by Fidel Castro, who proceeded to rule the country as a dictator for five decades.

The Panama Canal and the American Lake Economic interests were one of the reasons for the many naval landings and occupations in the Caribbean, but they were not the primary one, particularly during the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt (1901–1909). Impressed by the time it took the Oregon to steam from the West Coast to the Caribbean during the Spanish–American War, Roosevelt was far more concerned with the need for a trans-Central American canal and with incorporating the surrounding countries into America’s sphere of influence. If European powers could be persuaded that the entire Caribbean Sea was a de facto American lake, the United States could both build the canal and hold it in the event of a major war.

American diplomats first sought permission to construct a canal across Nicaragua. Once rebuffed, they turned their attention to Panama, a rebellious province of Columbia. The United States already had a long tradition of using military force in Panama (in fact, it had landed forces more than a dozen times since the 1850s to protect American lives and property), but it had never challenged Columbia’s claim to the province. That changed in 1903 when President Roosevelt actively conspired with a French

businessman and a group of Panamanian rebels to launch a rebellion. When fighting broke out on the isthmus in November 1903, President Roosevelt sent in 10 warships and landed a battalion of marines, preventing Columbia from quelling the revolution. Roosevelt’s gunboat diplomacy worked. The United States recognized Panama as an independent nation and its first ambassador to the United States immediately signed a treaty that gave Panama $10 million and rent of $25,000 a year in exchange for rights to construct and own a canal. The treaty also gave the United States a strip of land five miles wide on either side of the canal—the Canal Zone—which became an unincorporated US territory with its own courts and police force. The United States remained in Panama until the 1990s, and in 2000 it voluntarily turned operation of the canal over to the Panamanian government.

Having a canal meant defending it, and here President Roosevelt’s biggest concern was the small and fragile states nearby that owed millions to European banks. After Britain, Germany, and Italy imposed a naval blockade on Venezuela in 1902 to force it to repay its debts, Roosevelt decided to act. His Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine announced to Europe that, when disputes needed settling in the Caribbean, the United States—and only the United States—would intercede as “an international police power.” Thereafter, the United States found itself using military force in the Caribbean nearly continuously until 1934 (see Figure 11.1).

Figure 11.1 Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine and “big stick” diplomacy. Source: The Granger Collection/Topfoto.

The first application of the Roosevelt Corollary came in the Dominican Republic. Concerned about the nation’s ballooning debt and political instability, the United States negotiated a treaty with the country’s dictator in 1905. Thereafter, American naval officers managed the Republic’s finances through a customs receivership and steadily repaid its debts to Europe and the United States. Keeping the Dominicans’ revenues away from corrupt politicians, it was hoped, would both stabilize the country and remove the threat of European intervention. But the new system inevitably angered the Dominican elite, who had grown accustomed to receiving portions of the customs taxes. Instability increased and the Navy found itself perpetually in Dominican waters. In 1913, President Woodrow Wilson proposed a solution that went far beyond controlling the customs houses. The so- called “Wilson Plan” proclaimed that the United States would no longer support any government that came to power by force. Democratic elections would be held, even if the US president had to land marines to conduct them. Once a legitimate government was in place, the United States would stabilize it by building an army or police force and working to improve sanitation,

transportation, and education systems. In the president’s own words, this combination of carrots and sticks would “teach the South American Republics to elect good men4.” Much like the president’s later attempts to bring peace to Europe after World War I, it did not work. Wilson’s plan would form the basic framework for the long occupations of the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Nicaragua, none of which resulted in a smooth transition to peace or representative government.

The Dominicans took little notice of the Wilson Plan. In 1914, the Dominican secretary of war, General Desiderio Arias, broke with the government and took much of the army with him. The country again descended into violence, and the US Navy returned and bombarded the coast on four separate occasions. American sailors and marines went ashore and supervised an election that brought General Arias’ principal rival to power. In May 1916, the new president fled, and Arias’ army seized portions of the capital. Three days later, two battalions of marines began going ashore and soon 14 naval vessels policed the coasts. In November, the Americans declared martial law, and Admiral Harry S. Knapp became the military governor of the country.

Wilson’s goal was to “teach” good government to willing citizens; unfortunately, Admiral Knapp could not find many willing Dominican students. When elites refused to serve in the government, he appointed American military officers, some of whom held more portfolios than any one man could possibly manage. Marine Colonel Joseph H. Pendleton served as minister of war, the interior, the navy, and the police—all while commanding the US Marine Brigade. Another colonel served as minister of foreign relations, justice, and public instruction. These officers and their district commanders overruled local elites and enforced strict censorship of the press and mail, thus denying the Dominicans the very constitutional rights Wilson had trumpeted in his initial call for reform.

Admiral Knapp’s military government had some successes. By mid-summer, Arias had surrendered and organized violence had subsided except for banditry. The US Navy built 400 primary schools and made substantial improvements to the roads, ports, public buildings, and infrastructure. The marines patrolled regularly, confiscated thousands of weapons, and raised a small national police force—the Guardia Nacional—that was composed, ironically enough, of a number of former bandits. Violence declined. After the first year of the occupation, the Marines had suffered just four killed and 15 wounded and the total number of Dominican deaths was probably below 100.

But the peace did not last. Worried that the occupation would go on indefinitely, Dominican elites began to protest. The American military governor responded by tightening censorship laws, which generated more resentment. World War I absorbed the bulk of American attention and military manpower, which meant occupation forces both were under-resourced and suffered from poor morale. As violence ticked upwards, the marines relied increasingly on the Guardia, which often abused civilians and in at least one instance executed a dozen defenseless prisoners. Some marines began resorting to the same brutal practices seen in the Philippines, including murder and mutilation. By 1919, there were 3,000 marines engaged in pacification operations—three times the number that had landed in 1916—and still the violence continued.

Map 11.1 Caribbean interventions, 1900–1935.

In 1921, the US Senate held hearings on the occupation and concluded that American operations were ineffective but that the Dominicans were not ready to govern themselves. A new military governor, Marine Brigadier General Harry Lee, embarked on a series of reforms to professionalize the Guardia and rein in the excesses of the enlisted marines. These improvements brought another temporary peace and, in 1924, the Marines left the Dominican Republic. All told, the Marines lost about 100 men during the occupation and killed or wounded more than a thousand Dominicans. In 1930, the commander of the American-trained Guardia, Raphael Trujillo, seized power and ruled the country until 1961. After his assassination, the United States invaded again in 1965 and stayed for another five months.

The occupation next door in Haiti (1915–1934) lasted longer and provoked more controversy than the one in the Dominican Republic (see Map 11.1). Although Haiti freed itself from French colonial rule in 1804, it had been chronically poor and unstable ever since. Before the American occupation began, 17 of Haiti’s 24 presidents were overthrown by revolution and 11 held office for less than a year. At the start of the twentieth century, a small group of corrupt elites controlled politics and maintained their power by doling out money, most of which was drawn from government coffers. The country was badly in debt, both because of corruption and because American, French, and German investors had loaned the government enormous sums at high rates to develop railroads and agricultural interests. By 1911, the New York-based National City Bank (today’s CitiBank) had muscled out French and German investors and obtained a controlling interest in the Haitian national bank.

Economic motives soon combined with—or were disguised as—strategic ones. The American secretary of state received most of his advice on Haiti from Roger L. Farnham, who was simultaneously the vice president of the National City Bank, president of the Haitian national railway, and vice president of the Haitian national bank. Farnham consistently exaggerated the threat of European interference in Haiti order to encourage an American military intervention, which would help to protect his investments. Aware of the president’s concern about rival naval bases in Haiti, he warned the secretary that the German and French ministers were cooperating in the Caribbean and that “their plans include taking advantage of [a potential base site] at Môle St. Nicholas.”5

This was patently absurd, since by 1915 the French and Germans were busy slaughtering each other on the battlefields of World War I.

Farnham also withheld funds from the Haitian government in order to further destabilize the country, which caused the Office of Naval Intelligence to report that Farnham’s bank was “the chief contributor to the present financial stagnation of Haitian commerce” and “directly responsible for the present political conditions in Haiti.” When the country descended into revolution yet again in the summer of 1915, a mob in Port-au-Prince captured the Haitian president and dismembere