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Naval Battle of Manila Bay, May 1, 1898. Official Spanish Report

THE BATTLE OF CAVITE

SPANISH OFFICIAL REPORT

DEPARTURE FOR SUBIC.

On the 25th of April, at 11 p.m., says Señor Montojo, I left the bay of Manila for Subic

with a squadron composed of the cruisers Reina Cristina, Don Juan de Austria, Isla de

Cuba, Isla de Luzon, dispatch boat Marques del Duero, and the wooden cruiser Castilla.

This last could merely be considered as a floating battery incapable of maneuvering, on

account of the bad condition of her hull. The following morning, being at Subic, I had a

conference with Captain Del Rio, who, though he did not relieve my anxiety respecting

the completion of the defensive works, assured me that they would soon be finished.

In the meanwhile the cruiser Castilla, even on this short cruise, was making much water

through the bearings of the propeller and the opening astern. They worked day and

night to stop these leaks with cement, finally making the vessel nearly water-tight, but

absolutely impossible to use her engines.

One the morning of the 27th I sailed with the vessels to cover the entrance to the port

of Subic. The Castilla was taken to the northeast point of the island of Grande to defend

the western entrance, since the eastern entrance had already been closed with the

hulls of the San Quintin and two old merchant vessels which were sunk there.

With much disgust, I found that the guns which should have been mounted on that

island were delayed a month and a half. This surprised me, as the shore batteries that

the navy had installed (with very little difficulty) at the entrance of the bay of Manila,

under the intelligent direction of colonel of naval artillery, Señor Garces, and Lieutenant

Beneavente, were ready to fight twenty-four days after the commencement of the

work.

I was also no less disgusted that they confided in the efficacy of the few torpedoes

which they had found feasible to put there.

The entrance was not defended by torpedoes nor by the batteries of the island, so that

the squadron would have had to bear the attack of the Americans with its own

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Official Spanish Report on Battle of Manila Bay

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resources, in 40 meters of water and with little security. Our vessels could not only be

destroyed, but they could not save their crews. I still held a hope that the Americans

would not go to Subic, and give us time for more preparations, but the following day I

received from the Spanish consul at Hongkong a telegram which said:AEnemy=s

squadron sailed at 2 p. m. from the bay of Mira and according to reliable accounts they

sailed for Subic to destroy our squadron, and then will go to Manila.@

This telegram demonstrated that the enemy knew where they could find my squadron

and that the port of Subic had no defenses.

The same day, the 28th of April, I convened a council of the captains, and all, with the

exception of Del Rio, chief of the new arsenal, thought that the situation was

insupportable and that we should go to the bay of Manila in order to accept there the

battle under less unfavorable conditions.

THE RETURN TO MANILA.

I refused to have our ships near the city of Manila, because, far from defending it, this

would provoke the enemy to bombard the plaza, which doubtless would have been

demolished on account of its few defenses. It was unanimously decided that we should

take position in the bay of Cana Cao, in the least water possible, in order to combine

our fire with that of the batteries of Point Sangley and Ulloa.

I immediately ordered Del Rio to concentrate his forces in the most strategic point of

the arsenal, taking every disposition to burn the coal and stores before allowing them

to fall into the power of the enemy. I sent the Don Juan de Austria to Manila to get a

large number of lighters filled with sand to defend the water line of the Castilla (which

could not move) against the enemy=s shells and torpedoes. At 10 a. m. on the 29th I

left Subic with the vessels of my squadron, towing the Castilla by the transport Manila.

In the afternoon of the same day we anchored in the Gulf of Canacao in 8 meters of

water. On the following morning we anchored in line of battle, the Christina, Castilla,

Don Juan de Austria, Don Juan de Ulloa, Luzon, Cuba, and Marques del Duero ,while the

transport Manila was sent to the Roads of Bacoor, where the Velasco and Lezo were

undergoing repairs.

At 7 p. m. I received a telegram from Subic announcing that the enemy=s squadron had

entered the port at 3, reconnoitering, doubtless seeking our ships, and from there they

sailed with course for Manila.

The mail steamer Isla Mindanao arrived in the bay. I advised her captain to save his

vessel by going to Singapore, as the enemy could not get into the entrance probably

before midnight. As he was not authorized from the trans-Atlantic he did not do so, and

then I told him that he could anchor in shallow water as near as possible to Bacoor.

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At midnight gun fire was heard off Corregidor, and at 2 on the morning of the 1st of

May I received telegraphic advices that the American vessels were throwing their search

lights at the batteries of the entrance, with which they had exchanged several shots. I

notified the commanding general of the arsenal, Señor Sostoa, and the general-

governor of the plaza, Capt. Señor Garcia Pana, that they should prepare themselves. I

directed all the artillery to be loaded, and all the sailors and soldiers to go to their

stations for battle, soon to receive the enemy.

This is all that occurred since I sailed to Subic until the entrance of the American

squadron in the bay of Manila.

THE ARRIVAL OF THE ENEMY.

The squadron being disposed for action, adds Señor Montojo, fires spread, and

everything in proper place, we waited for the enemy=s arrival.

All the vessels having been painted dark gray color, had taken down their masts and

yards and boats to avoid the effects of projectiles and the splinters, had their anchors

buoyed and cables ready to slip instantly.

At 4 a. m. I made signal to prepare for action, and at 4.45 the Austria signaled the

enemy=s squadron, a few minutes after which they were recognized, with some

confusion, in a column parallel with ours, at about 6,000 meters distant; the flagship

Olympia ahead, followed by the Baltimore, Raleigh, Boston, Concord, Helena, Petrel,

and McCulloch, and the two transports Zafiro and Nanshan.

The force of these vessels, excepting transports that were noncombatant, amounted to

21,410 tons, 49,290 horsepower, 163 guns (many of which were rapid fire), 1,750 men

in their crews, and of an average velocity of about 17 miles. The power of our only five

effective ships for battle was represented by 10,111 tons, 11,200 horsepower, 76 guns

(very short of rapid fire), 1,875 crew, and a maximum speed of 12 miles.

THE FIRE FROM SHORE.

At 5 the batteries on Point Sangley opened fire. The two first shots fell short and to the

left of the leading vessel. These shots were not answered by the enemy, whose

principal object was the squadron.

This battery only had two Ordonez guns of 15 centimeters mounted and but one of

these could fire in the direction of the opposing fleet.

In a few minutes one of the batteries of Manila opened fire, and at 5.15 I made signal

that our squadron open fire. The enemy answered immediately. The battle became

general. We slipped the springs and the cable and started ahead with the engines, so as

not to be involved by the enemy.

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