What was the 1971 debate between Skinner and Chomsky about? How did their debate reflect the larger political context? Finally, if you were a psychologist in

Behaviorism and the Politics of the Mind

Lecture 6 HISC 117, Summer 2024

Matt Soleiman

Announcements

1. Office hours moved tomorrow: 10am to 12pm

2. Please submit your notes on today’s readings to Canvas

3. Readings/notes not required for Monday

4. Discussion today and Monday will include questions based on lecture rather than readings—full participation still required (at least one contribution to discussion per class)

5. A lack of “key points” slides today, since I am asking you to try to arrive at these conclusions in the midterm essay

Review of last class

• Two historical episodes where scientists, in some way, challenged reductionism • Edgar Adrian and EEG: Adrian resisted the reduction of the human mind to the human

brain via EEG recordings • The “new psychiatry”: psychiatrists pursued a holistic approach to prevention and

treatment of mental illness

• Through our discussion of EEG, we further explored the material culture of science • According to Borck, technology actively shapes our understanding of the mind and brain

• Finally, through our discussion of the new psychiatry, we explored the social/political complexities of a more holistic approach to mental illness • This kind of psychiatry initially related to genetics/eugenics • Over time, it was used by some to counter systemic racism

Roadmap for today

1. Behaviorism and B. F. Skinner

2. The beginning of Chomsky’s debate with Skinner

3. The larger political context of the Cold War

4. Some further tips for the midterm essay

The birth of behaviorism

• Behaviorism was a scientific approach in twentieth-century experimental psychology that emphasized, or in the most extreme cases only studied, what was directly observable and measurable

• Largely prohibited explanations that involved unobservable “internal states,” including the mental states

• Behavior was reduced to the observable, measurable, and supposedly lawful relationship between stimulus and response

• If and when terms were used that seemed to refer to mental states, these terms were redefined in terms of stimuli and responses—they were operationalized

• Behaviorism began with the research programs of the American psychologists Edward Thorndike and John Watson, but it is most famously associated with the radical positions of Burrhus Frederic Skinner, aka B. F. Skinner

Behaviorists adopted “Morgan’s Cannon”

In the late 19th century, the British psychologist Conwy Lloyd Morgan argued against anthropomorphism: the attribution of human characteristics, often mental characteristics, to animals

His argument against this practice is now known as “Morgan’s Cannon": “In no case may we interpret an action as the outcome of a higher psychical faculty, if it can be interpreted as the outcome of the exercise of one that stands lower in the psychological scale.”

Thorndike’s puzzle boxes

• As a graduate student at Harvard, Edward Thorndike attended a lecture from Morgan, where he was introduced to Morgan’s views on animal behavior

• Thorndike built a physical apparatus—the “puzzle box”—to turn Morgan’s Cannon into experimental science

• The puzzle box was a wooden cage that opened via a pully-and-latch mechanism • Thorndike placed a hungry cat into the box and

food outside of the box to observe if and how the cat “learned” to open the box

According to Thorndike, cats did not “solve” the puzzle box, but rather, engaged in a process of trial-and-error

The trial-and-error of behavior of cats followed what Thorndike called the “Law of Effect,” which related feelings of pleasure and pain to environmental effects of behavior:

“Of several responses made to the same situation, those which are accompanied or closely followed by satisfaction to the animal will, other things being equal…be more likely to recur…Those which are accompanied…by discomfort to the animal…will be less likely to recur.”

The behaviorism of John Watson • Described by the historian Cathy Gere as “one of the most unlikeable

characters ever to make his mark on science”

• While at U Chicago in early 20th century, he introduced the white rat to experimental psychology

• Extended Morgan’s Cannon to humans! • There was supposedly “no dividing line between man and brute”

• To Watson, psychology was about the “prediction and control of behavior”

• Founded the Industrial Services Corporation to psychologically analyze workers and maximize their labor for industrial profit

• Applied behaviorism to child rearing and advertising

B. F. Skinner’s “science of behavior”

• In the 1930s, while a graduate student at Harvard, Skinner redefined the “reflex

• To Skinner, the reflex was not a sensory-motor arc (nor a sensory-mental-motor arc), but “the observed correlation of stimulus and response”

• Skinner’s definition of the reflex conceptually transformed all processes of the nervous system/mind/brain into quantifiable patterns of behavior dependent on specific environmental conditions

• To put his idea into practice, he invented a new kind of experimental box—the Skinner box

The Skinner Box

Operant behavior in a Skinner box • Skinner further defined “operant behavior” as any behavior that

had a positive or negative consequence

• Operant behavior in the Skinner box was the pressing of a lever, which resulted in food

• Skinner considered lever pressing to initially be a “unconditioned” behavior, meaning that a rat or a pigeon would naturally engage in the behavior —they did not have to be trained or conditioned

• The initial “reflex” therefore was the observed correlation of food and eating, with the food “reinforcing” the operant behavior of lever pressing

• A shock would decrease the lever pressing

• Over time, with food as a reinforcer, lever pressing became a “conditioned,” or learned, response

• All changes in behavior—of any animal or human!—could be understood as a change in the “strength” of a reflex

Skinner operationalizes language • In 1957, Skinner published a book that argued

that even language, a defining feature of humans, was nothing more than operant behavior—it was simply “verbal behavior”

• Skinner proposed, without much empirical evidence, that behaviorists could analyze language in the same way as they had done with animal behaviors—by analyzing the environmental variables that controlled verbal behavior

• With Verbal Behavior, Skinner erased the boundary between humans and animals

Can pigeons read?

Breakout room discussion:

At this point in history, what would you think about Skinner’s position on language or the mind more generally?

The Skinner-Chomsky debate begins in the late 1950s

• Already critical of behaviorism, the linguist Noam Chomsky published a scathing review of Skinner’s book Verbal Behavior a few years after receiving his doctorate from Harvard (not the review you read)

• Chomsky argued that Skinner’s radical behaviorism fell apart when applied to human language, in large part because of the complexities of grammar which are first internalized as a child (through exposure/social interaction during early development)

• The acquisition of a first language in childhood demonstrated the importance of internal systems (of the mind and brain)

On the importance of internal systems

“The fact that all normal children acquire essentially comparable grammars of great complexity with remarkable rapidity suggests that human beings are somehow specially designed to do this, with data-handling or “hypothesis-formulating” ability of unknown character and complexity…At the moment, the question cannot be seriously posed, but in principle it may be possible to study the problem of determining what the built-in structure of an information-processing (hypothesis-forming) system must be to enable it to arrive in the available time.”

– Chomsky (1959)

Skinner’s Beyond Freedom and Dignity

• A New York Times Best Seller for twenty weeks

• Skinner made 40 radio and television appearances the year BFD was published

What did Skinner argue in his book?

Chomsky’s 1971 book review

Chomsky was a key figure in the emergence of the interdisciplinary field of “cognitive science” (a term coined in 1973), which became institutionalized through the founding of its own journal, scientific society/conference, undergrad degree, and a department at UCSD

What did Chomsky argue in his review of Skinner’s book?

Midterm essay

What was the 1971 debate between Skinner and Chomsky about? How did their debate reflect the larger political context? Finally, if you were a psychologist in the 1970s, would you side with Skinner, Chomsky, or instead try to reconcile their differing approaches and why?

Please note: the first question is about their 1971 debate between Skinner and Chomsky, not their late 1950s debate

You are welcome/encouraged to refer to their late 1950s debate, but this debate was not the same—it did not have the same stakes—as the 1971 debate

Key questions to ask when analyzing Skinner text

Can we say that Skinner is a reductionist?

If so, in what way is he changing reductionism in the “mind and brain sciences”? If the mind is not being reduced to the brain, then what is being reduced to what?

Remember the broader definition of reductionism: the explanation of something at a “higher level” of organization by (and often only by) something at a “lower level” of organization

The larger political context:

The Cold War

Cold War scientism

• Following WWII, there was a rise in the belief among experts, politicians, and laypeople alike that science, because of its objectivity, could solve social problems (scientism)

• Experts would serve as political authorities in society • The idea here was that objectivity (apolitical nature) of science

supposedly depended on its “freedom," which depended in turn on liberal democracy. • Science in turn could help win the Cold War

• In actuality, science was political • McCarthyism in science • More of the US budget was dedicated to science than ever before in history

Political ideologies of the Cold War • In the US, “liberal democracy” was, and often still is,

understood in opposition to “authoritarian communism”

• According to Jamie Cohen-Cole, American experts and policymakers of the period maintained that these different political systems had different kinds of political subjects (or model citizens)

• The political subject of liberal democracies was defined by open-mindedness (the open mind), while the political subject of authoritarian states was defined by close- mindedness (the closed mind)

• The open mind was autonomous/independent, creative, rational, tolerant, and ironically, free from ideology— mental characteristics that liberal democracies encouraged and depended upon

• The closed mind, by contrast, was rigid, narrow, irrational, conformist, intolerant/prejudiced, and ideological

The mind in Cold War America

• Cohen-Cole argues that the open mind was naturalized by cognitive scientists

• A political virtue became seen as a natural, and defining, feature of the human mind—the idea was that the human mind was also autonomous, creative, rational, etc.

• Ultimately, the interdisciplinary field of cog sci sought to establish this view of the mind

Other tips for the midterm essay

• Include a title page (separate page with your title, name, date)

• Write a unique title, perhaps with a subtitle (rather than “HISC 117 Midterm Essay”) • The title and subtitle usually convey the argument of the paper • The title can be fun or punny, the subtitle more serious and specific

• Please avoid starting your essay with a generality, e.g. “Since the dawn of time…,” since history is about specificity • Often history papers/essays open with a vignette, or historical episode, which is

concrete/specific and hence more engaging

• Remember, ChatGPT is prohibited and its use constitutes plagiarism

Possible outline

• Introduction w/ thesis (response to questions 1 and 2)

• Historical background section (1-2 paragraphs): The mind and brain sciences before behaviorism and Skinner

• Section on Skinner’s text

• Section on Chomsky’s text

• Section on how debate connects to larger political context

• Conclusion with thesis (in other words) and response to question 3

Next Monday

• We will explore the minds/brains of animals by delving deeper into cognitivism (a response to behaviorism)

• One reading (secondary source from Guenther) is on the history of the mirror test—the standard test for self-awareness

• Another reading is a primary source on “pleasure centers” in the brains of rats

1

The Case Against B.F. Skinner Noam Chomsky1

I

A century ago, a voice of British liberalism described the "Chinaman" as "an inferior race of malleable orientals."[1] During the same years, anthropology became professionalized as a discipline, "intimately associated with the rise of raciology."[2] Presented with the claims of nineteenth-century racist anthropology, a rational person will ask two sorts of questions: What is the scientific status of the claims? What social or ideological needs do they serve? The questions are logically independent, but the second type of question naturally comes to the fore as scientific pretensions are undermined. The question of the scientific status of nineteenth-century racist anthropology is no longer seriously at issue, and its social function is not difficult to perceive. If the "Chinaman" is malleable by nature, then what objection can there be to controls exercised by a superior race?

Consider now a generalized version of the pseudo-science of the nineteenth century: it is not merely the heathen Chinese who are malleable by nature, but rather all people. Science has revealed that it is an illusion to speak of "freedom" and "dignity." What a person does is fully determined by his genetic endowment and history of "reinforcement." Therefore we should make use of the best behavioral technology to shape and control behavior in the common interest.

Again, we may inquire into the exact meaning and scientific status of the claim, and the social functions it serves. Again, if the scientific status is slight, then it is particularly interesting to consider the climate of opinion within which the claim is taken seriously.

In his speculations on human behavior, which are to be clearly distinguished from his experimental investigations of conditioning behavior, B. F. Skinner offers a particular version of the theory of human malleability. The public reception of his work is a matter of some interest. Skinner has been condemned as a proponent of totalitarian thinking and lauded for his advocacy of a tightly managed social environment. He is accused of immorality and praised as a spokesman for science and rationality in human affairs. He appears to be attacking fundamental human values, demanding control in place of the defense of freedom and dignity. There seems something scandalous in this, and since Skinner invokes the authority of science, some critics condemn science itself, or "the scientific view of man," for supporting such conclusions, while others assure us that science will "win out" over mysticism and irrational belief.

A close analysis shows that the appearance is misleading. Skinner is saying nothing about freedom and dignity, though he uses the words "freedom" and "dignity" in several odd and idiosyncratic senses. His speculations are devoid of scientific content and do not even hint at general outlines of a possible science of human behavior. Furthermore, Skinner imposes certain arbitrary limitations on scientific research which virtually guarantee continued failure.

As to its social implications, Skinner's science of human behavior, being quite vacuous, is as congenial to the libertarian as to the fascist. If certain of his remarks suggest one or another interpretation, these, it must be stressed, do not follow from his "science" any more than their opposites do. I think it would be more accurate to regard Skinner's Beyond Freedom and Dignity as a kind of Rorschach test. The fact that it is widely regarded as pointing the way to 1984 is, perhaps, a suggestive indication of certain tendencies in modern industrial society. There is little doubt that a theory of human malleability might be put to the service of totalitarian doctrine. If, indeed, freedom and dignity are merely the relics of outdated mystical beliefs, then what objection can there be to narrow and effective controls instituted to ensure "the survival of a culture"?

In view of the prestige of science and the tendencies toward centralized authoritarian control which can easily be detected in modern industrial society, it is important to investigate seriously the claim that the 1 The New York Review of Books, December 30, 1971

2

science of behavior and a related technology provide the rationale and the means for control of behavior. What, in fact, has been demonstrated, or even plausibly suggested in this regard?

Skinner assures us repeatedly that his science of behavior is advancing mightily and that there exists an effective technology of control. It is, he claims, a "fact that all control is exerted by the environment" (p. 82). Consequently, "When we seem to turn control over to a person himself, we simply shift from one mode of control to another" (p. 97). The only serious task, then, is to design less "aversive" and more effective controls, an engineering problem. "The outlines of a technology are already clear" (p. 149). "We have the physical, biological, and behavioral technologies needed 'to save ourselves'; the problem is how to get people to use them" (p. 158).

It is a fact, Skinner maintains, that "behavior is shaped and maintained by its consequences" and that as the consequences contingent on behavior are investigated, more and more "they are taking over the explanatory functions previously assigned to personalities, states of mind, feelings, traits of character, purposes, and intentions" (p. 18).

As a science of behavior adopts the strategy of physics and biology, the autonomous agent to which behavior has traditionally been attributed is replaced by the environment — the environment in which the species evolved and in which the behavior of the individual is shaped and maintained. (p. 184.)

A "behavioral analysis" is thus replacing the "traditional appeal to states of mind, feelings, and other aspects of the autonomous man," and "is in fact much further advanced than its critics usually realize" (p. 160). Human behavior is a function of "conditions, environmental or genetic," and people should not object "when a scientific analysis traces their behavior to external conditions" (p. 75), or when a behavioral technology improves the system of control.

Not only has all of this been demonstrated, according to Skinner, but as the science of behavior progresses, it will, inevitably, more fully establish these facts. "It is in the nature of scientific progress that the functions of autonomous man be taken over one by one as the role of the environment is better understood" (p. 58). This is the "scientific view," and "it is in the nature of scientific inquiry" that the evidence should shift in its favor (p. 101). "It is in the nature of an experimental analysis of human behavior that it should strip away the functions previously assigned to autonomous man and transfer them one by one to the controlling environment" (p. 198). Furthermore, physiology some day "will explain why behavior is indeed related to the antecedent events of which it can be shown to be a function" (p. 195).

These claims fall into two categories. In the first are claims about what has been discovered; in the second,